December 28, 2006 by Baron Bodissey |
910 Group | 22:39:00 | |
Wretchard has an absolute must-read post today called “The Blogosphere at War”. It’s a first-rate analysis of the new internet-based information system that is now maturing, citing the blogosphere as the engine of change in how news is collected, analyzed, processed, and distributed.
A brief excerpt:
There is considerable interest in the idea that “blogs” are somehow able to offset the mainstream media’s (MSM) ability to sell a given narrative to the public, a power which is of considerable interest in peace and even more so in war. It is widely recognized that molding public perceptions through narratives is nearly as important in war as the outcomes on the actual battlefield. Palestinian Media Watch convincingly demonstrates that Arab and Muslim organizations have long made influencing international publics through print and broadcast media a strategic goal, especially in any confrontation with Israel. This effort has historically followed two tracks: the establishment of technically sophisticated media outlets like al-Jazeera to sell messages directly to audiences; and mounting information operations aimed at shaping the way in which Western Media outlets cover any issue of interest.
[…]
For most of the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006 Hezbollah repeatedly accused Israel of atrocity and wanton aggression as a way of neutralizing its superior firepower; and little of this cant was rebutted in timely fashion. When on December 4, 2006 an Israeli think-tank release released a study, supported by imagery, showing that Hezbollah had fired its rockets from civilian localities all over southern Lebanon at civilian targets in Israel , the war had already been over for five months and Hezbollah had long achieved its public relations objectives. In pointed contrast to this ponderous performance, private individuals — bloggers — had managed to explode many Hezbollah atrocity accusations against Israel carried by the MSM in very rapid fashion. These blogger accomplishments included demonstrating that a wire service photograph of a bomb-damaged Beirut had been digitally altered to enhance both the smoke and the damage; that photographs of supposedly dead civilians posed artfully in the rubble were faked; and last but not least, the unmasking of an often photographed Lebanese humanitarian worker (The Green Helmet Man) as a brutal Hezbollah public relations agent callously arranging children’s corpses for maximum effect. While the actual effect of these exposes on the international diplomatic climate may have been slight, observers of the 2006 war in Lebanon had found their white knight. The rapid and often effective response of the blogosphere raised hopes that the Internet might provide a way to neutralize the massive Islamic investment in media outlets and information warfare cells. What is the truth?
The only statement I would question is this one: It is widely recognized that molding public perceptions through narratives is nearly as important in war as the outcomes on the actual battlefield.
Delete the word “nearly”. Our success on the battlefield in Iraq and Israel’s success in Lebanon have been overshadowed by the enemy’s success in manipulating the news coverage of these events.
Our soldiers are superb and their martial skills are the greatest that history has ever seen. But we may yet lose the war because the people who control the portals of public information are cowardly and treasonous.
The information war has become more important than the bombs-and-bullets war.
Since the politicians are in thrall to the MSM, the dedicated information warrior has to detour around them. This is where Wretchard’s analysis and the work of the 910 Group converge.
Half of the task is the collection, analysis, processing, and distribution of information. The other half is what we do with it.
The Counterjihad is a proactive alternative to the traditional passive acceptance of what our leaders do on our behalf. Our leaders can no longer adequately protect us; other means of protection are even now being formulated.
Distributed intelligence can be an active process. It is forming new structures and strategies for countering the mujahideen in their attempts to suborn, infiltrate, corrupt, and destroy all that we hold dear.
Read Wretchard’s whole essay. It will help clarify the situation.
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Cross-posted at Gates of Vienna.
7 Comments
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I just finished “Prey” and had rather similar thoughts about the economic principles involved in such undirected mass behavior. Friedrich Hayek made the case for DI as superior to planning with pretty radical arguments quite awhile ago. I’d say that the web’s increasing the availability of information is just an inevitable aspect of the increasing global-dimensionality of life on Earth. I’m not sure that our brains, distributed or collectively, can handle the volume of information available, let alone handle the disinformation being spread, and not at all beginning to deal with responding or acting on the data. I’d say for those structural reasons alone that we are at the end of an era of expansion and interconnections–even with, and perhaps reciprocally because of computers, the data is overwhelming. The future book on “The Fall of the American Republic” will have a chapter on such topics. So while I wish you guys all the best, and while I’m tempted to ask to join your group, I’m not very confident in our abilities at this point to avoid the inevitable regression to some more human scale of things.
D. Ox
I also linked to this thoughtful piece in my blog, but in addition I noticed this link posted in the comments by one of Wretcherd’s readers. I think it would be germane for our group to look at ways to coordinate information warfare in various ways, including: subject matter linking, hours of the day coverage, analysis and tracking of which stories break the MSM “event horizon” (and why), etc. This opens up an entire field of study that can be marshalled for good here. Let’s do it.
Discerning Texan
That Townhall article’s approach is too combative. It would produce a more hostile media, not a less hostile one. There is an article in the October 2006 Military Review on counterinsurgency-proven Information Operations at the brigade level that covers how to approach the media. It was written by a Col. Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army, based on his experiences commanding a 5,000 man brigade inside Baghdad. I excerpted from it liberally and wrote about it at my site here.
I believe that by combining the general process of Information Operations (IO) described by Col. Baker with some of the blogging system design and processes envisioned by Wretchard and the need expressed in Bodissey’s posts here, that a workable framework can be built for getting the message out.
It will take lots of work, and lots of evangelism, to make it work though.
All too often, we smaller bloggers are preaching to the choir. Sure, it feels good to have others come along to agree with what we have to say or to have jaw-dropping reactions. And certainly the blogosphere has broken some important stories. But we are not affecting the msm–or, at least, not enough. On the plus side, subscriptions to various msm publications are down; nevertheless, that downturn doesn’t mean that people are reading the information available on the Internet–not yet.
Part of the problem is that Americans today want sound bites. Many readers don’t want to delve into the finer points.
2 paragraphs really jump out at me due to their relevance to 910.
1. ‘Encourage Thinkers’
“Although the number of Thinkers is bound to grow organically, it is in the obvious interest of information warriors to encourage more Thinkers — the equivalent of analysis cells — to follow issues of interest. First-class Think sites can dramatically improve the ability of the blogosphere to respond quickly and accurately to information that breaks across the Event Horizon.”
The 910 group is an excellent candidate for an ‘analysis cell’. Having so many members and professionals in different areas will be a huge benefit. We can also facilitate the thinker function by organizing, collecting, and connecting tons of information in a central location. We can also use the increased discussion abilities provided by forums over the more limited blog comment section to further the thinker aspect of the group.
2. ‘Create bridge institutions’
“Finally, the dissemination function of the blogosphere can be enhanced by creating bridge institutions which help narratives in the blogosphere jump the “spark gap” into the mainstream media. ”
This is also an effective function of 910. Once the name is both credible and widespread, it will be easy to push issues to various media sources. And with that credibility, the issues will push through quickly.
When one adds to the enemy’s clever manipulation, the daily damage to our credibility by BBC, CNN, AP, NYT, etc, and their willingness to believe the worst, and portray us in the worst possible light, it becomes clearer that it is a war of ideology on a grand scale. God help us. Nothing to do but stand and fight.
Baron and crew,
I have been chewing on this material and just finished the second post in my Counterjihad Infowar series. I think there is hope for us and that the enemy is weaker and not nearly as monolithic as we sometimes imagine, or as they want us to believe.